I. Introduction
In 1992 the then Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, Sir Anthony Mason, spoke of the Court's use of materials from other jurisdictions. He said that although the Court looked primarily to decisions in other common law jurisdictions, it also looked to relevant comparative law principles and what other systems of law might have to say about a particular problem. Legal problems, because they refl ect human problems, are not unique to any one system of law, he said 1 . Australian courts are not strangers to using foreign law in the process of judicial decision-making. As a relatively young ex-British colony, Australia often looked to the law of England and other Commonwealth countries, such as Canada and New Zealand, in seeking to establish and develop a common law for Australia. The decisions of the United States Supreme Court on constitutional matters have had a particular relevance, because the Australian Constitution was drafted with parts of the United States Constitution in mind.
Much less use has been made by Australian courts of materials concerning civilian and European Community (EC) law. It is that use which is the focus of my discussion today.
When Sir Anthony Mason spoke it could not have been said that recourse was often had to such materials, nor by all judges of the Court. Nor can that be said today. But there has been an increased interest in the law of these jurisdictions in the last 20 years or so since he spoke. That interest, and a more outward looking approach, coincided with the assumption by the High Court of a greater role in the development of a uniquely Australian common law.
I commence this lecture by discussing the background to the High Court's role. I will refer to the areas in which civilian and EC law has been applied, where it has not and areas where it might be considered in the future. I shall then discuss some recent decisions of the High Court in the main area in which civilian law is referenced, tort law. In that process, I shall take up the central theme of this lecture, which is to identify the use made of civilian law materials in judicial reasoning. In my conclusion I shall briefl y discuss factors which inhibit its wider use.
II. Background 1. The High Court's new role I confi ne my discussion to the High Court of Australia because of its position in the court hierarchy in Australia. The High Court sits at the apex of the court system in the Australian federation and is both the constitutional court and the fi nal court of appeal. The Court is responsible for the development of the common law, namely the non-statute law, for Australia, and is thus better placed than other courts to consider the perspectives of other legal systems. It has not, however, always had such a role.
At an early point in the history of Australia, the English common law and the rules of equity were received in the colonies to provide a basis for order and government 2 . English judgments had an authoritative status in Austral-RabelsZ ian courts, derived, in large part, from the emphasis placed upon uniformity and harmony of law in the British Empire. The Privy Council, which remained the fi nal appeal court for Australia for many years, upheld such uniformity as being "of the utmost importance" 3 . "Uniformity" meant conformity with the common law as declared in England. The decisions of the Privy Council were regarded as binding on all Australian courts. Decisions of the House of Lords were uniformly followed and applied, not only when there was no High Court decision on point, but also in cases of confl ict between decisions of the High Court and the House of Lords 4 . For some time the High Court also regarded Canadian and New Zealand courts as sister courts, in a single common law system, the judgments of which were highly regarded and often followed 5 . They were accorded a similar status to decisions of Australian State Supreme Courts. Their judgments were not "foreign" as such, but neither were they binding. The doctrine of a unifi ed common law declined in importance when the former colonies became independent members of the Commonwealth of Nations and became more interested in the development of their own law.
An early step towards the break from the traditions concerning the application of English law in Australia was taken by the High Court in 1963 6 , when it departed from a decision of the House of Lords. In 1978 it declared that it no longer regarded itself as bound by the decisions of the Privy Council and that State courts might regard themselves as so bound only when there was no relevant High Court authority 7 . In 1986 the High Court reinforced that stance with statements that English precedents generally were not binding and were useful only to the extent of the persuasiveness of their reasoning 8 . The process was completed, by the fi nal statutory abolition of appeals to the Privy Council, in the same year 9 . These events established what has been described as the precondition for an Australian jurisprudence 10 . 10 Crawford (supra n. 2) at 450.
New interests in civilian and EC law
It is perhaps a quirk of history that as England was loosening its infl uence over Australian law, it faced the prospect of its own law being infl uenced by EC law and the civilian laws of continental Europe. Since Britain became a member of the EC, English judges, in their extra judicial writings, have looked to Europe 11 , although a strong foundation had already been provided by émigrés who had taught civilian and comparative law in England postwar. Some credit for starting the debate about the use of European law has been given to Lord Scarman, who, in the Hamlyn Lecture in 1974, spoke of the New Dimension in English law 12 . From the 1990s English judges were invoking foreign law in support of their objectives 13 . When Sir Anthony Mason spoke of the High Court's interest in the law of non-common law jurisdictions, Australian judges would have been conscious of events unfolding in Britain and the debate concerning comparative perspectives. But the evident interest of Australian judges would not have been sparked by the pressures or infl uences which were relevant to English courts. Australian law would not be directly infl uenced by the law as determined by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), nor indirectly infl uenced by the civilian law which has shaped the jurisprudence of the ECJ. Australian law is not subject to the European Convention on Human Rights. The international human rights standards contained in that Convention have never been incorporated into Australian domestic law in a holistic way and that situation looks unlikely to change 14 . Rather the High Court was, for the fi rst time, in a position to develop a common law for Australia 15 . And whilst its members sought to do so by taking account of local conditions, they considered it necessary to look outward to developments abroad and in Europe.
III. Present and future use of European and civilian legal materials The two principal areas in which the High Court has made use of European and civilian law materials in the last 20 years are competition law and tort law.
The Court could hardly ignore EC law, as it related to competition law, given that the economic principles upon which the Treaty of Rome were based were used in drafting the competition law statute in Australia 16 . Decisions of the ECJ have been considered by the Court in connection with that statute's provisions concerning abuse of market power 17 and have continued to be referred to by lower courts which administer competition law.
But it is in the area of tort law that the courts in many jurisdictions have had to grapple with the same conceptual problems. It is therefore unsurprising that the subject of compensation for the wrongful infl iction of injury has been given so much attention by comparatists. The number of recent cases involving negligent acts or omissions, where the High Court has looked to civilian law materials, indicates the strong potential for a continued use of a comparative perspective in this area. I shall shortly refer to some of those cases.
The areas where there has not been an interest shown in the use of European or civilian law materials, or where there appears to be only the possibility of some limited use, are as follows:
(1) Restitution. -The Australian common law concerning restitution is not aligned to the position now taken by English courts, which have accepted a principle of unjust or unjustifi ed enrichment and developed it by reference to German law. The High Court does not recognise it as a free-standing principle, but prefers to see it as a concept which may explain why restitution is ordered in common law actions 18 . The relevance of civilian law in this area may therefore be limited.
(2) Good faith in contractual performance. -Despite the substantial debate in Europe and elsewhere about the adoption of good faith in the performance of contracts as an international standard, and the publications of bodies such as UNIDROIT, there has been little academic debate about it in Australia. The courts tend to address the issue only when a contract contains a good faith clause. The prospect of it as an overarching principle of contract law has not been dealt with by the High Court. where our laws differ. Nevertheless, EC laws have been referred to in copyright cases 19 and the perspectives of some civilian countries at least noted in a patent case 20 . (4) Constitutional and administrative law. -Little attention has been directed to civilian administrative and constitutional law in decisions of the High Court. Some would argue that the different distribution of power in civilian countries makes the importation of ideas in this area too diffi cult 21 . However, two decisions of the Court involving the constitutional guarantee of freedom of trade, commerce and communication between the States raise the possibility of some future consideration of "proportionality" as it is understood in German and EC law. It is a term already used in Australian constitutional law, but does not yet extend to a test of strict proportionality. But in the cases mentioned, a test of "reasonable necessity" has been propounded, which goes some way toward the European model.
These cases also suggest the possibility that the Court may look more to ECJ decisions in the same area. The Treaty of Rome provisions are similar and the High Court has now arrived at a similar view to that expounded by the ECJ about the invalidity of legislation which interferes with these freedoms; namely, that it is to be assessed by reference to its anti-competitive effects 22 . Now let me return to the area of torts to discuss some recent cases which have involved civilian law references.
IV. Recent cases -law of torts 1. Choice of law
In 2000 and 2002 the High Court decided two cases involving choice of law in tort. In the fi rst of them 23 the appellant challenged the existing common law rule, which determined liability based on the law of the forum in which the action was brought 24 . The rule had been subject to criticism and had been replaced in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. However, the argument put forward focussed upon the traditional prefer- RabelsZ ence of civil law jurisdictions for the law of the place of the tort as governing delictual liability 25 . The majority judgment accepted that this was the appropriate basis for liability where an interstate element was present. But it did so by somewhat different reasoning. It considered the basis given by French commentators for that system's approach, one founded in notions of sovereignty over the place of the commission of the tort, but did not consider that basis to be strong enough to mandate a preference of one choice of law rule over another. This was especially so in a federal system like Australia, where "sovereignty" is shared between federal, State and Territory law areas 26 . However, it reasoned that the fact that the same common law is applied throughout Australia weighed in favour of giving effect to the place of the tort 27 , thus arriving at the same conclusion.
The choice of law rule was again raised in a case which involved injuries received by a person as a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred in New Caledonia 28 , the legal system of which is based on French civil law. The accident was caused by the negligent design and manufacture of a vehicle by a company whose place of business was France and which had no connection to Australia. The law of the place of the tort was also confi rmed as appropriate to foreign torts and it was held that an Australian State court could apply that law. This was despite the defendant's argument that the Australian proceedings should be stayed to allow the foreign court to apply its own law. The test, the Court held, is whether the Australian court is "clearly inappropriate" to apply foreign law and this should not be assumed 29 . It was necessary for the defendant to show that some prejudice or injustice would result, and it had not done so.
In the process of reasoning the joint judgment returned to the question, which had been adverted to in the earlier case, why Savigny and other 19th century scholars had considered delictual liability to be more strongly linked to the law of the forum. The answer, provided by Professor Kahn-Freund, lay in the past perception of the civil law of delict as intimately connected with the criminal law. The Court observed that the common law appears to have shared that view, given its treatment of the law of torts in terms of moral condemnation and not compensation. But technology have changed the nature of delictual liability 30 . This was a view shared by both systems.
Breach of duty
In a case involving the obligation of police offi cers to "rescue" a person displaying suicidal tendencies, the bases for civilian laws creating a duty to render assistance were considered and compared with common law requirements.
A statutory power was given to police to apprehend a person if they believed the person was mentally ill and likely to commit suicide 31 . Two police offi cers came across the plaintiff 's husband in circumstances which strongly suggested he had been contemplating suicide. However, he appeared rational and assured them he had changed his mind. He took his life later that same day. His widow sued the police and the State for breach of duty. She claimed that a duty to apprehend and protect her husband arose both by reason of the statute and under the common law. The Court did not agree.
In the judgments, the difference between the approach of some civil law systems and the common law to this question was noted. Some civilian systems imposed a sanction for a failure to assist a person in these circumstances 32 , although it appeared that German law did not impose an absolute obligation to act in all cases. Historically, the common law has never imposed an obligation to rescue others. The reason for the fundamental difference between the legal systems was sought and found in the common law's reluctance to interfere with the autonomy of the individual. In this regard, Professor Zimmermann, in his study of the law of obligations, had observed that the common law has more of an affi nity with Roman law than does civilian law 33 . It was also observed in this case that the German courts appeared to give weight to the purpose of the protection afforded by the statutory rule. A purposive approach to the construction and application of statutes is conventional in Australian law and in this case it assumed some importance.
The purpose of the statutory provision was held not to be to prevent suicide; rather, it was to apprehend a mentally ill person who was at risk of harm because of their illness. The statutory power given to the police offi c- RabelsZ ers did not arise unless the police offi cers formed the opinion that the plaintiff 's husband was mentally ill, and they had not thought that he was. It was said that one could not assume a person was mentally ill because they had contemplated suicide. No such assumption was implicit in the statute's provisions, which did not depart from the common law's view of autonomy.
Notions of individual responsibility were also refl ected in a decision involving the duty of care owed by a hotel licensee to a customer who was affected by alcohol. The man left the hotel and was killed when his motorcycle ran off the road 34 . The Court held that the licensee was not required to ensure that he got home safely, for example, by ringing the man's wife. The majority said that licensees have various statutory duties in relation to the service of alcohol, but the common law does not prescribe a general duty of care which requires them to monitor the consumption of alcohol or to protect customers from the consequences of the alcohol they choose to consume 35 .
Loss of chance
This year (2010) the High Court rejected a claim for damages for the loss of the chance of a better medical outcome 36 . This was the fi rst time the Court had been presented with an opportunity to determine whether Australian common law could accommodate such a claim.
The plaintiff was a child who had presented at hospital with the effects of rubella, or chicken pox. Her symptoms included headaches and masked an underlying brain tumour. The surgeon was found to have been negligent in not ordering a scan when the plaintiff developed further symptoms which were indicative of a tumour. Had he done so, treatment would have been administered at an earlier time. However, the plaintiff could not prove that earlier treatment would have avoided, or even considerably reduced, the severe brain damage that she suffered. She could establish only that there was a chance that early intervention might have done so.
For the purposes of my discussion, the case may be said to have three distinctive features. In the fi rst place, it involved a topic upon which opinion was divided in both common law and civil law jurisdictions. Some United States courts had allowed such claims, the Supreme Court of Canada had not and the House of Lords also had not, although there were strong dissents in the decision of the House of Lords 37 . Secondly, the topic had generated a deal of academic debate, some of which was written from a comparative 34 perspective, and the plaintiff 's lawyers put these materials before the Court. Thirdly, as the extent of that debate suggested, the case involved a challenge to the requirements of the common law cause of action in negligence. Such fundamental questions of theory and policy inevitably encourage comparison with the approaches of other jurisdictions. The fi rst major issue was the concept of a loss of chance as itself being damage, as that notion is understood by the common law. Here, different theories of what constitute damage could be observed in different systems and this variety of approaches was a factor to be considered in determining whether such a loss was recognised as actionable at common law. In the principal judgment it was observed that while French courts recognised claims based on loss of a chance, French law appeared to have a much wider view of damage. On the other hand, countries such as Germany, which did not, seemed to require damage itself to have a value. This was closer to the Australian position.
The plaintiff also argued that the loss of a chance might be viewed as independent of the physical injury. This might favour the idea of it as a separate head of damage. But here the judgment drew upon both Canadian and German commentators 38 , who had pointed out that to view it in this way might require compensation even if no actual injury was suffered.
The other key issue identifi ed was the standard of proof required by Australian law. For the plaintiff 's case to succeed, the standard needed to be lowered to accommodate only the possibility, as opposed to the probability, that she would not have suffered brain damage, or as much damage as she did, had the surgeon not acted negligently. It was observed that the Australian standard was already relatively low, not requiring something approaching certainty, in contrast to some civilian countries. It had been suggested that the strictness with which French courts approach proof may have led them to resort to loss of chance as a solution 39 . And it was observed that other countries, like Germany, tempered a high standard of proof with a partial reversal of onus in cases of medical "gross negligence". The House of Lords had likewise shown a preparedness to override evidentiary requirements in an asbestosis case 40 . But in this case, the High Court was not asked to consider such an approach and the question whether it would do so was not decided. 
RabelsZ
In the result, the changes necessary to the requirements of the cause of action in negligence, to accommodate a claim for loss of chance, were considered too great. Policy considerations were not regarded as suffi ciently strong to warrant such fundamental changes to underlying concepts of the common law.
Causation; unsuccessful sterilisation; nervous shock
Problems of causation and the standard of proof were raised in a case involving the death of a man from lung cancer. This case did not involve explicit reference to civil law materials, but it dealt with an area that has been grappled with in most jurisdictions. He had been exposed to respirable asbestos fi bres in the course of his employment 41 . The claim was complicated by the fact that he had been a smoker. The evidence did not establish that asbestos exposure was probably a cause of the cancer. The fact that asbestos exposure might have been a cause did not satisfy the requirement of an affi rmative answer as to whether it was more probable than not. That also denied the prospect that asbestos exposure had been a materially contributing factor, which may suffi ce for liability. It was said that knowing that inhaling asbestos can cause cancer did not entail, in this case, that it probably did. The evidence did, however, suggest that smoking was a probable cause.
Medical negligence cases have also provided the opportunity for the Court to consider the approaches in other jurisdictions to a "wrongful life" claim 42 and a claim for damages by the parents of a child born after an unsuccessful sterilisation.
My discussion of the Court's decision in a "wrongful life" case is postponed for the purpose of a workshop to be held later this week 43 . For present purposes, I will simply record that the case did involve references to the outcomes of earlier German 44 and English 45 cases. The surgeon who negligently carried out a sterilisation procedure, which proved ineffective, was held liable to the parents of the child for the cost of raising and maintaining the child 46 . In the course of the judgments, reference was made to the different approaches taken by the courts in England, France and Germany to recovery in such cases. 
(2011)
The last case which I shall mention concerned a claim for psychiatric injury, of the nature of "nervous shock". The test of liability for such an injury was held to be whether it was reasonably foreseeable that a person in the plaintiff 's position might suffer psychiatric injury as a result of the alleged negligent act 47 . This did not require the plaintiff to show that a person of "normal fortitude" might sustain such an injury in the circumstances.
It was observed, in one judgment, that both common law and civil law systems had grappled with the diffi culties posed by these claims, of determining the boundaries of liability. The approach of German courts, in applying relevant provisions of the BGB 48 , was considered of interest in a number of respects. The limitation upon liability which German courts placed upon recovery, by reference to something like the normal fortitude test, was not adopted. But the extension of liability provided by German courts to persons suffering psychiatric injury, but who had not been at the scene of the accident, was implicitly approved 49 . And some common ground was found in the identifi cation by German courts of problems of causation in such claims, whilst at the same time recognising, as did the common law, that questions of policy were involved 50 .
V. The use made of civilian law materials -some observations
The use of materials about the laws of any foreign jurisdiction is a matter of choice for judges of the High Court. The fact that they have been used in these cases therefore raises questions as to when and for what purpose they are used.
It makes sense to look to how other jurisdictions have dealt with a novel problem, and the Court has done so, as may be seen by the wrongful life, the failed sterilisation and the loss of chance cases. But novel cases do not represent the only occasions on which consideration has been given to civilian law. And when resort has been had to civilian law, it is not always obviously for the purpose of seeking a solution.
The more minimal use of civilian law in the cases, usually by reference to texts, is by way of a simple reference to what that law concludes on a topic, without further analysis. The sterilisation case provides an example of this form of use. It may be open to the criticism that it conveys only that the judgment writer is aware of the approach of other jurisdictions and no more. 47 
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It is true that a mere reference to a civilian law standard or outcome does not convey that it has assumed any real relevance for the reasoning in the judgment. But that is the point. Such references are intended to convey that the judge has looked at the materials about that civilian law, noted what is usually a difference of approach, and determined that it does not assist in the process of reasoning. Because of the discipline usually demanded in concise judgment writing, it will not usually be possible to ascertain the extent to which the civilian law was considered by the judge. Even so, the fact that a judge has an eye to other jurisdictions cannot be a bad thing.
Any process of comparison will either identify apparent similarities or differences in approach. Both can be useful: the former to support legal conclusions that are reached and the latter to provide a springboard for analysis of one's own law. But what is the purpose of recognising sameness? This brings to mind the exhortation of Professor Kahn-Freund to his comparative law students -not to be lured by homonyms and not to be afraid of (hidden) synonyms 51 . But what is of most importance is to understand why the approaches of other jurisdictions are the way they are, and to use that understanding to form a more holistic view of one's own law and the direction that it should take. That understanding is critical to a body such as the High Court which is faced, on a daily basis, with novel and complex legal problems that invite consideration of the conceptual framework and underlying purpose of the law.
In 1992, when the former Chief Justice spoke about the High Court looking to non-common law jurisdictions, the terms "globalisation" and "harmonisation" had much currency. Courts might have then been encouraged to a perspective which saw these ideals as possible and therefore to search for sameness. Indeed, this may have infl uenced what Sir Anthony said on that occasion.
However, the cases reviewed do not suggest an identifi cation of sameness on that account. Ideals such as harmonisation and globalisation are likely to have less relevance for a court than they may for those involved in wider law reform. A judge of the High Court, whilst attempting to see the present and future shape of the law, is concerned with its incremental development and at the same time fi nding the solution to the case at hand.
Perhaps the use made of comparative law by English judges in the 1990s, which I have referred to, is more to the point; namely, that similar approaches of foreign jurisdictions can be used to confi rm the common law judge's decision as correct. In the cases to which I have referred, such a use of comparative law is evident in the reference in the rescue case -to the common approach of other jurisdictions to statutory interpretation; and in the nervous shock case -to the mutual recognition of the part policy plays in determining the bounds of liability.
The identifi cation of differences in approach may be useful, at a number of levels, to judicial thinking. At a basic level a difference between the common law and civil law may convey to the judge that there is no one right answer. And this will be confi rmed where there is further division of opinion within those systems, as occurred in the rescue and the loss of chance cases.
At the next level, analysis may be involved. The common law judge asks why the approaches of the legal systems are different. The rescue case furnishes an example of such an inquiry and one where the answer concluded the process of comparison. The Court was led to the inquiry because of criticisms of the common law rule and the need to fi nd an explanation as to why civilian systems required more of their citizens than the common law did. The answer lay in the social values which informed these legal rules: the common law was more individualistic, civilian law more socially impregnated 52 . In the result, the legal approaches were not truly comparable. The assistance which was gained by the reference to civilian law was an understanding as to why that was so.
The examination of differences can also facilitate an analysis, at a deeper level, of one's own legal structures. The loss of chance case highlights the possibilities for a critical appraisal of the requirements of a cause of action in common law negligence by reference to the different requirements of civilian systems.
The analysis, it will be recalled, occurred in relation to damage, causation and proof. In relation to each of these issues the understanding reached about civilian law illuminated the common law requirement, the reason for it and how it was linked with the other requirements. The recognition of what the Australian common law required for something to amount to "damage" was aided by comparison. The stricter civilian standard of proof accounted for the initial acceptance of claims of loss of chance; whereas the common law's standard was seen, by contrast, as already accommodating some certainty of proof. This suggested that very strong reasons were required to effect a fundamental shift in the common law and coherence was ultimately preferred. Nevertheless, it may be said that civilian law was used to better examine and explicate Australian law.
I said at the outset of this part of my discussion that the cases reviewed did not refl ect any assumption that a solution was to be found in other jurisdictions. That is not to say that the Court has not been open to ideas. In the nervous shock case the prospect that the duty could be extended to persons RabelsZ not present at the scene was implicitly approved, although it must be conceded there may be two reasons for that. It may have involved taking up the German approach; or the Court may have been using that approach to justify a conclusion already reached. In the fi rst choice of law case whilst the basis for the civil law's preference was not applied, it led the Court to reason about how it translated to the Australian context, a process which led to the same conclusion. The possibility of taking up more ideas or solutions remains for the future in the area of torts.
VI. Factors which inhibit the use of foreign materials
In the second choice of law case the Court expressed some confi dence in Australian trial courts being able to apply foreign law. But in such cases the courts are assisted by expert evidence. No such assistance is provided on the rare occasions when material about a civilian law is put before the Court by way of argument, as occurred in the loss of chance case.
That case was unusual in that the lawyers for one party took the step of including a large amount of writing on the subject as an adjunct to the written outline of argument. In most cases, the possible use of a comparative perspective would not occur to most lawyers. But having invited that perspective, the plaintiff 's lawyers were only able to identify the systems which supported the conclusion for which they argued. They did not identify how the material was to be used to answer the various questions raised in the case, and in the plaintiff 's favour. The other party did not really respond to the material.
All of this of course indicates that Australian litigation lawyers do not have a background in comparative method. And of course it must be said that Australian judges are the product of the same system of learning, although they may be expected to have a more developed understanding of, and interest in, other legal systems because they need to view a problem in a wider perspective. The lack of background is easily explained. It follows from a lack of teaching and a lack of academic discourse in foreign jurisdictions and in comparative method.
A comprehensive comparative law course was fi rst offered in Australia in 1948 53 . Despite this promising start, the teaching of comparative law remains largely in a developmental stage. A study in 1996 showed that less than half of the law schools in Australia offered any comparative law subjects 54 . This has substantially improved, but very few of those do make it a compulsory subject in the Bachelor of Laws degree. However, one law school conducts a Masters of Comparative Law programme in conjunction with the University of Mannheim 55 . The courses which are available vary enormously in their content. Not all involve the teaching of traditional methods of comparative law. The number of students undertaking the courses is small.
The reasons why Law Schools have not encouraged the study of comparative law may be many. They may consider that it requires high level second or even third languages, which is not common amongst students in Australia. They may well have found diffi culty in fi nding teachers, although that is an obvious outcome if a subject is not widely taught. Many of the lecturers in the subject have come from overseas. One cannot help but wonder whether the subject has been viewed by the Law Schools as of academic interest rather than of practical benefi t. Law Schools have tended to become training grounds for practising lawyers. Even so, one would think that the process of analysis of, and understanding of, one's own system that it provides might be viewed as adding to the intellectual armoury of a litigation lawyer.
The reality is therefore that it will be judges who undertake research into civilian law themselves. Of course they can require the parties' lawyers to address argument to a particular area of law, which might include a comparative perspective, but they are conscious of adding to the costs of litigation. They would not always be suffi ciently confi dent that the use to which European civilian law materials may be put warrants requiring the parties to conduct research, not the least because it may not offer a solution. Its utility may lie in analysis and the parties to an appeal may not appreciate that this is important.
It must then be said that the task of researching civilian law materials is not an easy one for Australian judges. The principal diffi culties will be obvious, but I offer these observations. The principal resource material about civilian jurisdictions is comparative law texts. Regardless of their quality and how informative they are on their topic, they cannot always explain the intricacies of the interaction of civilian code provisions. In this regard it must be recalled that judges at a high appellate level are dealing with complex issues.
Texts also tend to state the law by reference to how a code is intended to operate. Common law judges prefer to observe how a law is actually applied by other courts, in order to better understand it. Even making allowances for the possibility that civilian codes might reduce the opportunity for individual activity on the part of the courts, common law judges would fi nd it RabelsZ diffi cult to accept that civilian judges make no law at all and have no inventive function in dealing with the shortcomings of statutory rules 56 . When faced with the decisions of civilian courts, most common law judges would need the assistance of a summary. Without a comprehensive knowledge of a legal system it is diffi cult to truly understand the critical issues and reasoning upon which a decision of a civilian court turns. By contrast, the decisions of the ECJ are rendered more intelligible because the opinion of the Advocate General on the case is also published.
VII. Conclusion
It has been said that there is no such thing as comparative law, only methods or a variety of methods useful in particular to look at one's own law 57 . Despite the diffi culties which attend the use of foreign materials, there is undoubted benefi t to be gained from the perspective it provides. Moreover, one should not assume that ideas and even solutions from other jurisdictions will not present themselves in the future.
Australia is often described as a young country. It was obliged, for much of its early history, to depend upon the decisions of English courts for guidance. In recent times the High Court has been engaged in developing a uniquely Australian common law. In doing so, it has shown a greater willingness to consider the jurisprudence of courts outside of the traditional common law family. And while it is often the case that decisions of the ECJ and European civil law are referred to simply to bolster a decision already reached, the civil law is being increasingly involved to deepen the existing understanding of our law and the future direction it should take. Comparative law has been lifted from a purely academic context and now forms part of the judicial method.
